Sufficiency of Evidence: Negligent Bus Maintenance

WMATA v. Jeanty, __ A.2d __ (D.C. 1998). Opinion by Schwelb, joined by Terry and Farrell.

FACTS: Jeanty was seriously hurt while exiting from the rear door of a Metro bus. The rear door allegedly closed too quickly, catapulting her off the bus onto the pavement. Jeanty had an independent witness who saw the door eject her "like someone shot out of a cannon." Discovery revealed that the bus had missed its last four scheduled preventive maintenance inspections, which are supposed to be done every two weeks. Inspections include the adjustment of the door speed regulator that controls the door opening and closing. Plaintiff called a WMATA maintenance inspector at trial as an expert to establish that the door speed is regulated by this device and that it is part of the regular inspections. However, the WMATA man was not asked if he believed the accident probably resulted from negligent maintenance. Jury returned verdict for plaintiff. Trial judge denied motion for judgment as a matter of law based on the sufficiency of the evidence.

OUTCOME: Judgment for plaintiff on jury verdict AFFIRMED.

HOLDING: (1) Plaintiff did not need expert testimony identifying the likely cause of the malfunction. Since plaintiff made a prima facie showing of negligent maintenance, causal connection could be inferred.

(2) Plaintiff did not need expert testimony on the standard of care for frequency of maintenance inspections, because WMATA's violation of its own standards here was "sufficiently extreme" to make a case that the carrier had breached its duty to exercise the "highest degree of care."

(3) Plaintiff's failure to show that the door speed regulator ever malfunctioned before the date of her accident was not a fatal flaw in her case, because she alleged that WMATA would have discovered the defect if it had done proper inspections and therefore WMATA had "constructive notice."

QUOTE: "Having negligently failed to inspect, WMATA cannot now claim victory upon the ground that the plaintiff was unable to establish facts which the missed inspections might well have revealed. No party should be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong ...."

PRACTICE NOTE: Case has good discussion of the duty of care by a common carrier and of the elements of a res ipsa loquitur case against a carrier. This case did not qualify for res ipsa, because even though the door mechanism was under WMATA's exclusive control, the plaintiff needed expert testimony that the type of accident that injured her does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. See opinion fn. 10.

Statute of Limitations: Continuous Treatment Rule Applies in D.C. Medical Malpractice Cases

Anderson v. George,
___ A.2d ___ (D.C. 1998). Opinion by Reid, joined by Steadman and King.

FACTS: Anderson underwent surgery for tubal sterilization by the defendant. Two days later she had emergency surgery after complaining of abdominal pain and had to be hospitalized for a week. She filed suit against the surgeon more than three years after the initial surgery that she complained of, but less than three years after the surgeon stopped treating her complications from the surgery. Trial court dismissed case on grounds that plaintiff readily could have ascertained her injury at the time she had the second surgery two days after the first.

OUTCOME: Summary judgment for defendant on statute of limitations REVERSED.

HOLDING: "[W]e now hold that the continuous treatment rule is applicable in the District of Columbia. Thus, in medical malpractice actions involving continuing treatment for the same or related illness or injury, the cause of action is tolled until the doctor cases to treat the patient in the specific matter at hand."

COMMENT: Court adopts reasoning from its recent decision in R.D.H. Communications, Ltd. v. Winston, 700 A.2d 766 (D.C. 1997), in which it applied the "continuous representation rule" applicable in legal malpractice cases to toll the SOL until the representation ceased.

Non-Binding Arbitration: Failure to file Demand for Trial de Novo on Time

Siddiq v. Ostheimer, __ A.2d __ (D.C. 1998). Opinion by Steadman, joined by King and Pryor.

FACTS: In a non-binding arbitration, Siddiq was awarded $25,000 for injuries received when Ostheimer rear-ended Siddiq's car. Clerk of civil division converted this to a judgment after Multi-Door Division informed clerk that no one had demanded a trial de novo within 15 days under Arbitration Rule X(b). Defense counsel then moved to vacate, alleging that he had sent a demand for trial de novo to the court for filing on time. Counsel offered no explanation of why the demand failed to make it into the court jacket. Trial court then vacated the judgment on the authority of Civil Rule 60(a) and prior appellate decisions vacating arbitration judgments entered by the clerk for filing errors. Parties went to trial, and plaintiff received a "no damages" verdict from the jury.

OUTCOME: Trial court's vacation of arbitration judgment for plaintiff REVERSED and judgment based on arbitration award reinstated.

HOLDING: Trial court had no authority to grant relief for counsel's inadvertence. Prior decisions vacating arbitration judgment were based on court system's fault. Court lacked authority under either Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b) to vacate the award. Rule 60(a) is only for correction of clerical errors, and Rule 60(b) expressly doesn't apply to arbitration judgments.

COMMENT: Court stresses that defense counsel was "given every opportunity" to explain what happened with the filing of the trial demand. Since he offered no reason to believe that the court system was at fault for the failure of the document to be filed, defendant could not raise due process objection to entry of judgment on arbitration award. Contrast Liss v. Feld, 691 A.2d 145 (D.C. 1997), where arbitration judgment was vacated because the timely filing of a demand for trial was not properly forwarded by one division of the court to another.

Statute of Limitations: Sexual Assault by Chiropractor Can Be Negligence Invoking 3-Year Statute

McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman
, __ A.2d __ (D.C. 1998). Opinion by Belson, joined by Farrell and King.

FACTS: Plaintiff alleged that she was a patient of the defendant chiropractor and that she discussed numerous personal matters during their visits, for which he counseled her. On about six occasions during a nine-month period, the defendant allegedly assaulted her sexually. During this time, plaintiff alleged that she was incapable of consenting to sex because she was addicted to Valium. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant violated a recent D.C. statute making it a crime for a person who provides "medical, therapeutic, or counseling" professional services to engage in a sexual act with a patient if the actor knows or has reason to know that the patient is impaired from declining to engage in the act. D.C. Code § 22-4115. Plaintiff also alleged she was non compos mentis at the time her cause of action arose, therefore tolling the statute of limitations. Trial court dismissed case on statute of limitations argument that claims of assault were governed by a one-year limitation (D.C. Code § 12-301(4)) and not a three-year limitation for negligence because the allegations of sexual conduct did not relate to chiropractic services. The trial court also rejected the non compos mentis claim on the ground that since the plaintiff made a report of rape to the police during the time of her alleged disability, she was able to assert her legal rights.

OUTCOME: Dismissal REVERSED and case reinstated.

HOLDING: (1) Plaintiff can make a claim for medical malpractice, subject to three-year SOL, if plaintiff proves that during the course of the chiropractic treatment, "a relationship similar to a psychologist-patient relationship developed between the two," that it was a breach of the applicable standard of care for the chiropractor to have sex with the patient during that time, and that the breach of the standard of care proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.

(2) "Consent to the sexual acts, freely and competently given, would be a defense to such a theory of liability." Capacity to consent is a fact issue.

(3) Plaintiff's argument that she can use D.C. Code § 22-4115 to establish a standard of care is premature since it needs to be established that the statute was adopted to promote public safety.

(4) Plaintiff raised sufficient facts of her non compos mentis status to withstand summary judgment. Fact that she didn't have expert testimony on her mental status was not fatal since she had testimony from her husband that she was unable to function. The fact that she may have reported a rape to the police also does not demonstrate as a matter of law that she was aware of her legal rights.