Landlord Not Liable for Injuries to Commercial Tenant's Invitee Based on Tenant's Lease Violation

Settles v. Redstone Development Corp.,797 A.2d 692 (D.C. 2002). Opinion by Schwelb, joined by Farrell and Glickman. Trial judge: Diaz.

FACTS: Plaintiff, who worked in a shoe store, was hurt when a soaked ceiling tile in the store fell on her. Malfunctioning air conditioning unit above the ceiling was responsible for the water in the ceiling. Plaintiff sued the building owner on theory that it knew or should have known that the shoe store wasn't keeping the air conditioner maintained as the lease required. Plaintiff pointed out that shoe store had ignored requests from owner to send owner a copy of a preventive maintenance agreement with an HVAC servicing company as required by the lease. Lease gave landlord a right to do repairs when tenant failed to do so. Trial court granted summary judgment to building owner, agreeing with defendant's contention it owed no duty to plaintiff.

OUTCOME: Summary judgment for building owner AFFIRMED.

HOLDING: Landlord's right to make repairs if tenant defaults on lease obligation to do the repairs doesn't create a duty for the landlord to make them.

COMMENT: Court distinguishes case relied on by plaintiff, Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 719 A.2d 119 (Md. 1998), where tenant kept a pit bull in an apartment in violation of the lease, and the dog killed a child invited to the apartment by the tenant. Maryland Court of Appeals held that landlord's right to demand that tenant get rid of dog created sufficient control to give rise to a duty by the landlord to injured third parties. D.C. court says Matthews was limited to dangerous instrumentalities like vicious dogs.

Court Can Go Beyond Four Corners of Broad Settlement Agreement to Determine if Parties Really Intended to Release Other Claims

Patterson v. District of Columbia,__ A.2d __ (D.C. 2002). Opinion by Washington, joined by Wagner and Schwelb. Trial judge: R. King.

FACTS: Plaintiffs settled section 1983 claims with D.C. government concerning constitutionality of civil forfeiture procedures. Settlement agreement broadly released all claims including claims for "costs." Plaintiffs did not explicitly reserve right to claim attorneys' fees. However, plaintiffs' counsel had already filed petition for attorneys' fees, which the District opposed on the merits, before the plaintiffs signed the broad release language. District did not contend the fee claim was waived by the release until fee petition was on appeal. Trial court, following a D.C. Circuit case that had construed almost identical language against the releasing plaintiffs, granted summary judgment for District that fees had been waived by release.

OUTCOME: Reversed and remanded for consideration of plaintiffs' attorney fee petition.

HOLDING: In applying objective rule of contract interpretation, which looks beyond the terms of the contract only if they are ambiguous, court was required to assess what a reasonable person would have thought the terms of the disputed language meant. In this case, that requires looking at the circumstances surrounding formation of the contract. Here it was clear that counsel on both sides did not think boilerplate language of release concerning "costs" was intended to include attorney fees.

COMMENT: Case significantly undermines the "objective test" of contract interpretation and allows extrinsic evidence in many circumstances even where contract language seems plain. Court declines to follow D.C. Circuit case, Elmore v. Shuler, 252 U.S. App. D.C. 45, 787 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1986), which held that because the statute allowed attorneys' fees "as part of costs," 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a release of claims for "costs" had to include attorneys' fees. Court says one must evaluate what a reasonable person would have thought the contract language meant. Court adds: "This reasonableness determination involving an evaluation of the surrounding circumstances is to be applied whether the contract's language appears ambiguous or not."

Evidence: Prior Similar Incidents

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. McDavitt, __ A.2d __ (D.C. 2002). Opinion by Glickman, joined by Steadman and Ruiz. Trial judge: Braman.

FACTS: Railroad engineer was hurt when he ran his engine through a red signal and it derailed half a minute later on a derail switch. He sued Amtrak for comparative negligence under the FELA statute, 45 U.S.C. § 51-60. At trial, plaintiff claimed the signal malfunctioned despite lack of any specific evidence supporting that. He was allowed to introduce evidence of prior failures of other signals controlled from the same tower, on the theory that this put Amtrak on notice of the need to watch out for wayward engines and warn the engineer to stop. But judge refused to let Amtrak put in evidence of plaintiff's disciplinary record and job suspensions for running a stop signal and running through a switch aligned against his movement. Amtrak wanted to put in this evidence to counter plaintiff's economist's assumption that plaintiff would have worked a full and uninterrupted career until a normal retirement if he hadn't been disabled by this accident. Judge said this could unfairly prejudice the jury on liability. Jury found for plaintiff.

OUTCOME: Judgment for plaintiff AFFIRMED on liability, REVERSED on damages.

HOLDING:

(1) Trial court properly exercised its discretion to admit the evidence of two prior signal malfunctions a year before this one, since judge instructed jury that they were admitted not to prove that the signal facing the plaintiff malfunctioned, but to show that Amtrak was on notice of the possibility of signal malfunctions and the need to protect against them. Differences between the incidents went to their weight, not admissibility.

(2) Trial court should have admitted evidence of plaintiff's discipline for prior events, since it was relevant to his claim for total loss of earning capacity. Court could have guarded against the jury improperly considering the evidence as showing a propensity for running red signals by a variety of techniques: (1) instructing defense counsel not to argue propensity; (2) instructing the jury on the limited purpose of the evidence for damages; (3) bifurcating the trial, if he thought the first two techniques were insufficient protection.

OUTCOME: Court shows instinct toward admitting evidence on closely balanced issues as long as jury is properly given limiting instructions.

Police Shooting: Insufficient Evidence of Prior Acts to Show that Police Department Should Not Have Entrusted Officer with a Gun

Phelan v. City of Mount Rainier, __ A.2d __ (D.C. 2002). Opinion by Wagner, joined by Farrell and Belson. Trial court: Rankin and Zeldon.

FACTS: Off-duty Mount Rainier police officer went with his roommate to roommate's ex-wife's home in D.C. to take car that roommate co-owned with ex. When ex-wife's new husband pulled out gun, police officer shot him to death. Widow sued Mount Rainier for, among other things, negligent supervision and negligent entrustment of firearm to officer. It was conceded that widow needed direct liability theory to hold city liable since officer was off-duty and employer did not require him to carry his weapon off-duty. Officer had history of (as a deputy police chief had written) "uncontrollable outbursts of rage and lack of control or discipline, disrespect for ... superior officers," plus an incident of excessive force while detaining a suspect. Trial court granted summary judgment to city.

OUTCOME: Summary judgment for defendant AFFIRMED.

HOLDING:

(1) Plaintiff could not prove negligent supervision where there was no evidence that failure to discipline officer caused the off-duty shooting.

(2) Officer's checkered disciplinary history could not make a claim for negligent entrustment of a firearm since he had had no prior episodes of misusing a weapon. Evidence was insufficient to show that city knew or should have known officer would use his weapon in a manner involving risk of harm to others.

BRIEFS

Error to dismiss with prejudice a small claims action where the plaintiff left courthouse before trial due to alleged medical disability. Redman v. Kelty,__ A.2d __ (D.C. 2002). In case involving sale of two kittens that has dragged on since 1997, trial court dismissed for failure to prosecute after plaintiff, who appeared for trial in the morning, left courthouse before court reached case at 2:30 p.m. Plaintiff alleged she had chronic illness that allowed her to attend court for only half-days. Appeals court holds that trial court must consider lesser sanctions than dismissal with prejudice, especially because of plaintiff's allegations of a disability.

No Section 12-309 Notice requirement for D.C. Water and Sewer Authority. Dingwall v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth.,__ A.2d __ (D.C. 2002) (en banc). In per curiam en banc decision, two judges dissenting, court reinstates panel decision that plaintiff was not required to give six-month notice under D.C. Code § 12-309 to Water and Sewer Authority. Notice statute applies by its terms only to actions against the District of Columbia, by contrast to Federal Tort Claims Act, which expressly applies to federal agencies. Court also rejects argument that D.C. Code § 43-1672(b), which makes WASA "subject to" all laws applicable to agencies of the District government, confers 12-309 protection on WASA. Court said that statute means only that WASA must comply with same laws that all D.C. agencies must comply with.